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Seeds of systemic corruption in the post-Brexit UK 
Purpose – This article assesses the risks of systematisation of corruption in the UK following 
the Brexit referendum. 
Design/methodology/approach – The article applies theoretical and empirical findings of 
criminological, social, psychological, economic and legal research on the causes of systemic 
corruption to the socio-institutional developments following the Leave vote. 
Findings – The events surrounding the referendum confirm that the resort to corrupt practices 
is normalised in certain sectors of the British institutions, business and media and that socio-
political processes activated by the Leave vote and inadequate UK policy- and lawmaking can 
aggravate the situational and socio-psychological enablers of systemic corruption. Effective 
solutions must go beyond mere anti-corruption laws and address deeper social issues.  
Research limitations/implications – The article focuses only on some of the major situational 
and socio-psychological causes of systemic corruption, including the unintended criminogenic 
effects of the law. More interdisciplinary research is required to address other causes, such as 
historical and cultural factors.  
Practical implications – The findings of this article can inspire practical solutions by 
policymakers and future research. 
Social implications – The article contributes to raise social awareness and stimulate public 
discussion on systemic corruption in the UK and on the consequences of the referendum on 
public and private integrity. 
Originality/value – The article offers the first systematic analysis of the effects of Brexit and 
the referendum on corruption through an integrated interdisciplinary approach to systemic 
corruption in the UK.  
Article classification – Research paper 
Keywords – Brexit, Integrity, Systemic Corruption, Anomie, Legitimacy, Politics, Lobbying, 
Press, Media, Immigration, Corruption proofing, Lawmaking 
Introduction 
The suggestion that the United Kingdom (UK) is corrupt – let alone systemically corrupt – can 
scandalise many or sound like a provocation, given the country’s global standing against 
corruption. Nevertheless, in the last few years, the taboo of corruption in the UK (Barrington, 
2016a) has been seriously shattered by the exposure of corrupt practices embedded in certain 
environments of the public and private sectors (Whyte, 2015). The Brexit referendum and the 
following events provide both a case study and an opportunity to assess the risks of 
systematisation of corruption in the UK. The purpose of this article is to perform such an 
assessment and to recommend possible remedies. To do so, we will adopt an interdisciplinary 
approach integrating different explanations of systemic corruption elaborated by scholars from 
different fields.  
In the first part of the article, we will provide a definition of systemic corruption as a 
phenomenon departing from existing legal definitions, which are found to be too narrow (Ellis 
and Whyte, 2016; Beetham, 2015). We will also illustrate some of the major situational and 
socio-psychological causes of systemic corruption combining criminological explanations of 
crime and corruption with the sociological theories of anomie and strain, the psychological 
theory of legitimacy and the more recent theory of the criminogenic effects of the law. In the 
second part of the article, we will examine the social, political and legal developments 
following the referendum in the light of the above theoretical framework and some relevant 
economic studies to verify the claim that corruption is actually getting systemic in the UK and 
to identify the risks of such systematisation posed by the processes triggered by the referendum. 
In the final part, we will present our findings and make our proposals to mitigate such risks.  
 
Systemic corruption and its causes 
Systemic corruption is the normalised resort, across different levels and sectors of society, to 
abuses of entrusted private or public power as ordinary means to pursue personal interests. As 
such, it consists not only of criminal conduct, such as bribery offences, but of any other illegal 
or even unethical behaviours (Grasso, 2017; Huisman and Vande Walle, 2010; Gray, 2013), 
such as collusive relationships, influences, and arrangements, which, while not being 
necessarily illegal, can enable corrupt schemes and are perceived as corrupt by the general 
population (Ellis and Whyte, 2016; Beetham, 2015; Johnston, 2005; Doig and Theobald, 2000). 
Systemic corruption encompasses not only the grand corruption of powerful elites but also 
petty corruption and minor breaches of integrity committed by public officers, private citizens 
and businesses. Systemic corruption is a relational concept: it can refer to any socio-
organisational system, such as the national system as a whole or any of its sub-systems (the 
politico-institutional system, the system of business and finance, the health system, the system 
of education etc). The causes of systemic corruption are many and complex. We will 
distinguish between situational causes and socio-psychological causes, but, in reality, the line 
between the two categories is often blurred due to their continuous interaction, as the following 
paragraphs demonstrate. 
 
Motivations, opportunities and normalisation 
Situational causes can be identified not only, like for any other crime, in motivations and 
opportunities (cf. Cantor and Land, 1985; Coleman, 1987; Coleman, 1992; Clarke, 2016), but 
also in specific patterns of normalisation of such behaviours (Cressey 1953; Ashforth and 
Anand, 2003). As symbolic constructions defining certain goals and activities as desirable, 
motivations are influenced not only by situational circumstances (Coleman, 1987) but by 
deeper socio-cultural evolutions, as we are about to see. Opportunities are situations that make 
certain behaviours possible or more tempting (Coleman, 1987; Clarke, 2016). They include, 
amongst others, the lack of adequate controls and access to suitable victims, often facilitated 
by the position of power of the perpetrator (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Graycar and Sidebottom, 
2012; Graycar and Masters, 2018; Klitgaard, 1988). The normalisation of corruption takes 
place through mutually reinforcing processes of rationalisation (Cressey, 1953), 
institutionalisation and socialisation (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Rationalisation is the 
neutralisation of the moral and cognitive dissonances caused by the corrupt behaviour; 
institutionalisation is the embedding and routinising of corrupt practices in organisational 
structures and processes; socialisation is the inducement of newcomers to view corruption as 
permissible or even desirable, also through organisational learning processes (Prabowo, 
Sriyana and Syamsudin, 2018).  
 
Anomie and institutional illegitimacy 
On a deeper socio-psychological level, systemic corruption is caused by a state of anomie and 
by a lack of legitimacy of the law and the institutions. Anomie is a condition in which the 
excessive socio-cultural emphasis on material goals of success, which aggravates the human 
tendency to unlimited desires (Durkheim, 1897) and causes individual strains (Agnew, 2006), 
is not balanced by the availability of legitimate means to attain them (Merton, 1938; Merton, 
1968) and by effective institutional efforts to promote alternative models of self-worth 
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 2013; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997). Anomie generally occurs in 
periods of great and rapid change, when society fails to adjust individual passions to new 
standards. Relevant changes can be not only the worsening of economic conditions, which may 
motivate individuals accustomed to a better wellbeing to maintain it through unlawful means, 
but also the improvement of financial opportunities, which may foster greed and unlimited 
desires (Durkehim, 1897). At a psychological level, anomie entails a shared perception that a 
particular social system is falling apart, which results from a perception of the “disintegration” 
of social trust and moral standards and of “disregulation” – that is, the illegitimacy and 
ineffectiveness of society’s leadership (Teymoori, Bastian and Jetten, 2017). Such perceptions 
undermine the legitimacy of the law and the institutions and are the basis for the processes 
rationalisation, institutionalisation and socialisation. When people stop believing that the law 
and the authorities operate within an appropriate ethical framework and are fair and effective 
they are less likely to obey to their prescriptions (Jackson et al., 2014; Jackson et al., 2012; 
Darley et al., 2004; Tyler, 2001; Tyler, 1990).  
 
The corruption of the law 
A less perceptible cause of systemic corruption is the so-called “corruption of the law” 
(Pasculli, 2017; Pasculli, forthcoming), which occurs when the law itself and the policies 
behind it become a factor of corruption and its systematisation. This can be either the intended 
result of undue political and private influences on the processes of policy- and lawmaking 
(Giavazzi and Barbieri, 2014) or, more often and more insidiously, the unintended result of 
poor policy- and lawmaking (Albrecht and Kilchling, 2002; Savona et al., 2006a; Hoppe, 2014; 
Kotchegura, 2018). The corrupting effects of the law can act both on a situational level and on 
a socio-psychological level. At a situational level, legal provisions can strengthen criminal 
motivations, provide opportunities for crime, or undermine the effectiveness of controls 
(Pasculli, 2017). Scholars have identified a set of typical regulatory situations which carry 
crime risks: (1) the introduction of burdensome obligations; (2) the introduction of concessions 
on taxes, fees or obligations; (3) the introduction of grants, subsidies, or compensation 
schemes; (4) the introduction or increase of costs of legal goods; (5) the prohibition, restriction 
or reduction of the availability of demanded products or services; (6) the introduction, removal 
of or other changes to a law enforcement capacity; (7) the attribution of regulatory powers to 
public officials (Morgan and Clarke, 2006). At a deeper, socio-psychological level, any source 
of law and any institution in charge with its implementation can more or less inadertently 
facilitate the processes of rationalisation, institutionalisation and socialisation of corrupt 
behaviours. Counterproductive or unreasonable policies, unnecessarily burdensome 
obligations, inaccessible or obscure provisions, unfair or delayed administrative or judicial 
decisions, ineffective law enforcement, all contribute to undermining the social trust of the law 
and the institutions and the perception of their legitimacy. This, in turn, erodes the generalised 
willingness to spontaneously observe their prescriptions and provides convenient patterns of 
self-excuse. The binding and abstract nature of the law and its general applicability fosters the 
widespread institutionalisation of corrupt practices based on flawed legal provisions (Pasculli, 
2017).  
 
The referendum, Brexit and the systematisation of corruption in the UK 
The UK is not generally considered systemically corrupt. The public perception of corruption 
has been steadily reducing in the last few years and the UK has been climbing the rankings in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, jumping from the 14th place in 
2014 to the 8th in 2017 (Transparency International, 2018). The widespread idea of incorrupt 
UK institutions is supported by the integrity of many public servants (Foster-Gilbert, 2017). 
The UK has an exemplary standing in the global fight against corruption (cf. EU Commission, 
2014; OECD, 2017; Transparency International, 2017a and 2017b) and a number of anti-
corruption measures taken in the last few months – such as the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-
2022, the Criminal Finances Act 2017, the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and 
Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/692), the Sanctions 
and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the launch of the International Anti-Corruption 
Coordination Centre (IACCC), and the recent announcement of a new national economic crime 
centre (HM Government, 2017) – have dissipated the worries that after the Brexit vote anti-
corruption might slip down the list of the government’s priorities (Barrington, 2016b; Hough, 
2017). Relatively effective law enforcement and the independent judiciary provide adequate 
controls to contrast petty corruption.  
Such optimistic perceptions, however, are challenged by the recent exposure of various 
corruption scandals. Some studies even suggest that corruption is endemic in the private and 
public sector and sustained by a culture of impunity (Whyte, 2015). The apparent contradiction 
between public perceptions and scholarly research can be solved – at least partially – 
considering our definition of systemic corruption. Those who point at the systemic character 
of certain corrupt practices in the UK usually refer to grand corruption schemes perpetrated by 
powerful members of public institutions or private organisations, such as for instance the 
collusion between politics and the press (Cathcart, forthcoming), while we could find no 
evidence that petty corruption and a culture of illegality is widespread across public servants 
and the general population. It appears, therefore, that while corruption can be considered 
systemic at relatively high levels of certain sectors of British public and private life (namely, 
some areas of political power, of the press and of the financial and corporate environment), it 
is not yet affecting the national system as a whole. (This is not to suggest, however, that the 
grand corruption of the powerful elites is not harmful: on the contrary, its consequences can be 
devastating for the UK population, for other countries and for the global democratic 
governance: see Whyte, 2015). The analysis of the political and social developments 
surrounding the Brexit referendum seems to support such impression, but at the same time 
reveals the emergence of factors that might easily lead to the systematisation of corruption at 
a national level. 
 
Post-Brexit anomie 
The UK is affected, like many other countries, by a chronic state of anomie determined by 
industrialisation and globalisation (cf. Durkheim, 1897; Passas, 2000) and manifested in the 
inequality that affects the British society (McCann, 2016), which was one of the major reasons 
behind the Leave vote (cf. Dorling, 2016; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Bell, 2016; Los et al., 
2017; McCombie and Spreafico, 2017). Rapid changes to Britain’s economic and social 
structure in the last decades have pushed to the margins those who lack the education and skills 
required to thrive amid the modern, post-industrial and globalised economy, together with 
relatively well‐educated workers who lack the opportunity to take good jobs in the areas where 
they lived and feel marginalised in society (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin and Heath, 
2016; McCombie and Spreafico, 2017). In such a context, the outcome of the Brexit 
referendum is instigating other major and rapid socio-economic changes which have the 
potential to aggravate the anomic conditions of the country.  
This is true irrespective of whether the effects of Brexit will be detrimental for the British 
economy or not, for, as we have seen, both improvements and deteriorations of financial 
conditions can be criminogenic. If, as predicted by many economists, Brexit will reduce trade 
opportunities (Van Reenen, 2016) and exacerbate regional inequality (McCombie and 
Spreafico, 2017), citizens and businesses might turn to illegal means to achieve their objectives. 
Increased poverty and unemployment and the disillusion of the frustrated promises of 
Brexiteers might increase the strains which many citizens have expressed through the Leave 
vote and might motivate them to undertake criminal activities. New constraints and costs on 
trade with European countries, particularly in the “no deal” scenario, might induce UK 
businesses to circumvent them illegally. On the other hand, new business opportunities might 
as well generate opportunities for corruption. To pursue new trade prospects, UK investors and 
companies might be induced to neglect compliance and acquiesce or engage in corrupt 
practices solicited by firms or officials from more corrupt countries or to try to exert undue 
influences on policymakers (Inman, 2018). The risk will be higher if, as suggested by the Prime 
Minister (May, 2017), the UK will strike trade deals with countries, such as China, Brazil, India 
and the Gulf States, which are not well placed in the fight against corruption (Hough, 2017; 
Transparency International, 2018). Other opportunities for corruption concern lobbying. After 
the referendum, former political operatives and advisers have assumed roles in the lobbying 
industry or even set up their own firms (McTague, 2017). Obviously, this can open the doors 
to various collusive arrangements which frustrate the democratic processes of political 
representation and aggravate the perceptions of the disintegration of social trust and 
disregulation of social leadership typical of the anomic state, thus eroding the legitimacy of 
political institutions. 
Unethical lobbying in the context of Brexit is an excellent example of the anomic condition 
which affects the British society. As the Prime Minister’s speeches on Brexit make clear (May, 
2017 and 2018), the main objectives valued and pursued by the British government in leaving 
the EU are the usual materialistic goals of global liberalism, which are not counterbalanced by 
an equivalent institutional emphasis on alternative values such as solidarity, equality, integrity 
and accountability, as we shall see in the next paragraphs. However, the government is failing 
to fulfil the promise to provide efficient means to achieve them and to regulate these means 
and drawing a clear line between what is legal and what is not. Revolving doors and other 
questionable forms of lobbying which are unequivocally considered corrupt by the public, for 
instance, are perfectly legal in the UK (Ellis and Whyte, 2016). Similarly, trading in influence, 
that is the abuse of real or supposed influence on political decision-making in exchange for 
undue advantages (so-called “peddling”), is not a criminal offence in the UK, despite its 
criminalisation is imposed by both the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the 
Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Some forms of trading in 
influence can be prosecuted as bribery offences under the Bribery Act 2010 or under any of 
the 112 offences relating to political donations established by the Political Parties, Elections 
and Referendums Act 2000, but such a fragmentary framework does not help the development 
of a clear social perception of what is acceptable and what is not (cf. Transparency 
International, 2016), hinders effective prosecution and provides an easy avenue for patterns of 
normalisation. 
 
Political delegitimisation and the press 
The Leave vote was an expression of the perceived illegitimacy of political elites rooted on the 
departure between the values of such elites and the values of the “left behind” (Goodwin and 
Heath, 2016). Other developments in British politics preceding and following the referendum 
demonstrate the gradual erosion of various constitutive elements of institutional legitimacy: 
integrity, fairness, effectiveness and accountability. As for integrity and fairness, the Leave 
campaign was stained with deliberate exaggeration, half-truths and untruths (cf. Major, 2017). 
The deliberate insistence of the then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson MP on the misleading 
figure of £350 million per week allegedly paid by the UK to the EU despite the rebukes of the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (Emmerson, 2017) and the UK Statistics Authority (Full Fact Team, 
2017) is one notorious example (Cohen, 2016). Moreover, the physiological conflict intrinsic 
to political life has degenerated to pathological levels, causing intolerance of opposite views 
and condemnation of dissenters, as it happened in the case of conservative MPs who, after 
voting against their party on amending the EU Withdrawal Bill to subject the final Brexit deal 
to parliamentary approval, have been called “rebels” or “mutineers” by a certain press and have 
received death threats (Asthana and Stewart, 2017). As for effectiveness, Brexit advocates have 
neither proposed a serious political programme for leaving the EU, nor assumed any 
responsibility in conducting the leaving process (Bush and Lewis, 2016), while those in charge 
with it – ironically guided by a remain supporter, the Prime Minister Theresa May MP (May, 
2016) – struggle to find viable solutions, much to the frustration of both leave and remain 
supporters. As for accountability (which is a function of both integrity and effectiveness), no 
serious institutional action has been taken to expose, condemn and sanction unfair and 
unethical practices – not even in the most macroscopic cases of misrepresentation. 
In this scenario, the press and the media play a fundamental role. The sensationalist 
mystifications and mockeries perpetrated by tabloids and other media can destroy the 
institutional legitimacy and dramatically alter democratic processes. Branding the High Court 
judges who issued the decision in the Miller case [1] “enemies of the people”, as the Daily May 
did (Phipps, 2018), undermines public trust in the judiciary and threatens its independence. 
Accusing EU representatives to be attempting to “punish” Britain (Scotto di Santolo, 2018) 
through restrictive trade conditions might contribute to delegitimise the future laws regulating 
such conditions and to facilitate the rationalisation, institutionalisation and socialisation of 
practices to circumvent them. Things get even more disquieting when one considers that the 
papers that are mostly responsible for such misconduct are backed by powerful lobbyists 
(Cathcart, 2016). The second Leveson inquiry on the British press was recently cancelled also 
thanks to collusive relationships between politicians and the press, in what has been defined “a 
landmark moment in the corruption of British public life” (Cathcart, forthcoming). This 
confirms that corruption is already endemic at least at certain levels of the British politics and 
press. 
 
The unintended corrupting effects of policy- and lawmaking after the referendum 
Brexit is having a considerable impact on lawmaking. On the short term, the UK will need new 
legislation to address the immediate regulatory consequences of withdrawal. The European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 plays an important role in this respect. On a longer term, the UK 
will need new regulations to shape the relationships with the EU and new international allies. 
Both these lawmaking processes entail corruption risks. Sections 8 and 9 of the EU 
(Withdrawal) Act confer on ministers the power to make regulations to deal with deficiencies 
arising from withdrawal, comply with international obligations and implement the withdrawal 
agreement. Such regulations may make any provision that could be made by an act of 
Parliament. In other words, the Bill contains powers to make changes – with some exceptions 
– to current primary and secondary legislation by statutory instruments which do not require 
the full scrutiny of Parliament (so-called Henry VIII clauses) (Barnard, 2017). Some of these 
are likely to create the situations identified by Morgan and Clarke as crime/corruption risk 
indicators (Morgan and Clarke, 2006). The Act clearly states that the regulations can provide 
for new functions and new authorities, which might entail attributing new regulatory powers 
to public officials (indicator n. 7), as well as variously affecting law enforcement capacities (n. 
6). They might well introduce new or more burdensome obligations (n. 1), as well as new 
concessions (n. 3) or restrictions to the access to goods and services (n. 5). On a socio-
psychological level, the fact that such regulations are drafted by ministers, rather than the 
Parliament, increases the risks of poor lawmaking and lessens public participation in 
lawmaking, and ultimately diminishes their perceived legitimacy, according to the 
psychological patterns highlighted above. 
A powerful example of possibly criminogenic law- and policymaking is provided by 
migration regulation. Migration has been one of the most powerful points of the Leave 
campaign. The Prime Minister has promised a more restrictive immigration policy (May, 2017) 
favouring high-skilled individuals. The predominant focus on skills can be misleading and 
short-sighted. Research shows that while migration per se has no significant effect on 
corruption, immigration from corruption-ridden countries boosts corruption in the destination 
country (Dimant et al., 2014). Empirical evidence suggests that high-skilled migrants from 
corrupt countries are not necessarily less corruptible than the average citizen in their home 
countries and might even export corrupt practices embedded in their original social system to 
the destination countries (Dimant et al., 2013 and 2014). Restricting immigration on the sole 
basis of skill levels will be therefore not enough to prevent such an importation of corruption. 
The well-educated and well-off children of powerful oligarchs from systemically corrupt 
countries would satisfy the high-skills requirements to study and work in the UK, and, once in 
the country, they might perpetuate the corrupt habits and networks entrenched in their socio-
cultural background. 
 
Disembedding corruption in the UK. Conclusions and recommendations 
Four main findings follow the above observations. First, the Brexit referendum and the Leave 
campaign have been affected and the leaving process is being affected by corrupt relationships 
and practices which were probably already embedded in sectors of the political system and the 
media (cf. Whyte, 2015; Cathcart, 2016; Cathcart, forthcoming). The facts surrounding the 
referendum, therefore, offer further evidential support to the suggestion that the resort to 
corrupt practices is normalised in certain environments. Second, the outcome of the referendum 
has triggered socio-political processes which can aggravate the situational and socio-
psychological factors that are the major causes for the systematisation of corruption, thus 
increasing the risk of a further spreading of corrupt practices and culture across other areas of 
the British society. At a situational level, following the referendum, new motivations and 
opportunities for specific corrupt schemes, such as revolving door appointments and collusive 
arrangements with foreign business partners, are emerging. At a socio-psychological level, 
Brexit can exacerbate the anomic condition that affects the UK and further erode the perceived 
legitimacy of the law and the institutions. Third, despite its ever-enlarging anti-corruption 
armamentarium, there seem to be many loopholes in UK regulations which facilitate the 
normalisation of corruption, to the extent that behaviours considered corrupt by the public or 
by international law, such as revolving door appointments and trading in influences, are neither 
clearly criminalised nor prohibited at all. Moreover, there is little awareness of the possible 
criminogenic effects that some policies and laws might entail – particularly when they are 
driven by intuition rather than be based on up-to-date scientific research.  
These findings lead us to suggest some possible remedies.  
 
Restoring legitimacy 
The British political class must restore institutional legitimacy. This cannot be achieved, as 
many politicians around the world pretend, just by trying to please the public at all costs: the 
difficulties in finding an agreement on the future relationships between the EU and the UK 
prove that it is impossible to please everybody and that populistic decisions (i.e. the 
referendum) may irreversibly lead to a cul-de-sac. On the contrary, restoring legitimacy 
requires a most demanding effort to reinstate integrity, fairness, effectiveness and 
accountability. There should be comprehensive regulatory and disciplinary systems to 
responsibilise politicians, the media and lobbyists. Unacceptable political misconduct, such as 
the deliberate spreading of misinformation, should be sanctioned with disciplinary penalties, 
such as immediate resignations, and in the most serious cases should be prosecuted as a 
criminal offence. In some cases, the offences under the Fraud Offence Act 2006 might apply. 
The media must acknowledge their social responsibility and act accordingly. The effectiveness 
of the regulatory framework of the British press should be seriously reconsidered. Freedom of 
the press should never mean freedom from ethical constraints. Deliberate unethical practices 
should be unequivocally qualified as unacceptable and appropriately penalised. Lobbying also 
needs better regulation (Barrington, 2016a). Corrupt lobbying practices should be prohibited 
by the law and sanctioned accordingly. As suggested by Transparency International (2015; 
2017c), an independent body with appropriate resources and the power to impose adequate 
penalties should be established to supervise lobbying. Trading in influences should be 
unambiguously criminalised. Other than punitive measures, positive sanctions can be used to 
promote and reward ethical practices (cf. Bobbio, 1969). Finally, to be effective and fair, 
policies and laws must refrain from any irrationalism or intuitionism and be firmly grounded 
on verifiable research findings obtained through equally verifiable scientific methods and must 
be respectful of the tenets of the rule of law, including the highest standards of protection of 
individual rights and freedoms. The Post-Brexit high-skill migration policy is a clear example 
of the possible side-effects of a policy which is not informed by adequate research.  
 
Corruption-proofing the law 
The UK must become more aware of the possible corruptogenic effects of legislation and adopt 
appropriate mechanisms to prevent them. Eastern European countries adopt various 
mechanisms to proof draft legislation from the risks of corruption (Hoppe, 2014), which is 
inspired by the crime risk assessment mechanism (CRAM) proposed by some criminologists 
to crime-proof EU law (Savona et al., 2006a; Savona et al., 2006b; Calderoni et al., 2012; 
Caneppele et al., 2013). These “corruption-proofing” mechanisms are a special form of 
regulatory impact assessment adopting a risk-based approach similar to that suggested by 
international organisations to evaluate and mitigate the risks of corruption or other financial 
crimes in corporations or institutions (e.g. FATF, 2013; UN Global Compact, 2013). Such 
mechanisms generally entail a first phase in which experts assess corruption risks of proposed 
regulation and a second phase in which they make recommendations to amend it so as to 
remove any corruptogenic factors. The UK legislative processes are well suited to incorporate 
a corruption-proofing mechanism, perhaps shaped on the model of regulatory impact 
assessments. Such mechanism, however, is not a panacea: a shift of perspective is required to 
make policy- and lawmaking immune from corruption risk. While the complexity of the issues 
of contemporary globalising societies requires the specialised contribution of experts and 
technicians from different fields, a holistic view on the law is required when introducing new 
policies and regulation, to prevent corruptogenic gaps and contradictions between different 
areas of regulation. To this purpose, consultations are a precious instrument and they could 
well include specific questions concerning risks of corruption. Moreover, it is imperative that 
the experts appointed to advise on policy- and lawmaking are unbiased, highly qualified and 
operate with verifiable scientific methods. The appointment of impartial academics is certainly 
preferable to the appointment of self-proclaimed experts somehow connected to political 
parties.  
 
Changing values 
Regulatory solutions are necessary but not sufficient. To resolve the deepening anomic state 
affecting the British society a change of values is required. The institutions must commit to 
mitigating the excessive emphasis on financial goals and promoting the development of legal 
and social norms founded on alternative goals of self-worth and achievement based on the 
intrinsic value of the human being, which have been long neglected in substance – despite the 
many formal proclamations of civil, political, social and economic individual rights. Such a 
shift is all but easy and immediate. It requires resisting the global pressures coming from the 
neoliberal ideology serving the interests of powerful countries and corporations, to embrace an 
idea of globalisation founded on the universal value of the human person. This, in turn, means 
promoting values of solidarity, diversity, equality and reversing the feelings of insecurity, fear 
and anger which then lead to populism, nationalism, xenophobia and discrimination, through 
concrete socio-economic measures to make British society more equal and provide everyone 
with the appropriate intellectual, psychological, social, and financial resources to achieve their 
needs and ambitions. The problem is that such reforms require a political willingness which is 
highly unlikely to grow spontaneously in a context in which politics are largely influenced, 
more or less legitimately, by the private interests of powerful corporations and financial elites. 
Against the temptations of defeatism or populism, the most formidable weapon remains 
knowledge. Intellectuals, including (but not limited to) academics, educators and journalists, 
have the duty-responsibility to produce verifiable knowledge about the realities of the system 
and its context and disseminate it through appropriate means of information and across all 
levels of education, so as to elevate the level of popular understanding and discourse about the 
above issues and develop the critical and rational attitude which is required to produce change 
(cf. Haney, 1993; Russell, 1939).  
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